Integrated System for Detection of Dangerous Materials and Illicit Objects in Cargoes  by Avtonomov, Petr & Kornienko, Valeria
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  195 ( 2015 )  2777 – 2785 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
1877-0428 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Istanbul Univeristy.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.06.393 
World Conference on Technology, Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Integrated System for Detection of Dangerous Materials and Illicit 
Objects in Cargoes
Petr Avtonomova *, Valeria Kornienkoa
aRatecLab Ltd, 193230, Oktyabrskaya nab. 44/2, St. Petersburg, Russia
Abstract
Terrorist attacks have nowadays become a serious threat, and this threat only continues to grow. The objects of transport 
infrastructure are among the primary targets for such attacks. We review the existing means of detecting the transportation of 
dangerous materials and illicit objects and show that no systems are available that completely meet the requirements of homeland 
security and are simultaneously cost-efficient for cargo inspection. The current equipment is either both bulky and very 
expensive, does not provide completely reliable inspection results, or demands a time-consuming inspection procedure requiring 
several types of scanner (which is unacceptable given the huge and permanently increasing volume of transported cargo).We 
compare various techniques of detecting the transportation of dangerous materials and illicit objects, discuss how they correspond 
to the current needs, and propose a possible solution to the existing serious problems.As the next step towards the reliable 
detection of dangerous materials in large cargoes we propose development of an integrated system that combines the best 
features of the most developed technologies; namely, X-ray analysis (providing the high-speed monitoring and identification of 
suspicious objects and areas) and neutron analysis (providing high selectivity and precise identification). Such a layered approach 
would allow the avoidance of the unnecessary scanning of all objects in the active interrogation mode, thus reducing the 
inspection time. Moreover, it makes it possible to clarify all suspicious areas in the container via a single system 
inspection.RatecLab Ltd develops universal detection system of high resolution gamma spectroscopy for tagged neutron analysis
with time-of-light filtering (Skolkovo Grant 2014-2015). Neutron analysis system equipped with our high resolution 
spectroscopy platform will give most reliable answer on dangerous substance detection in large dimensions cargo. We 
demonstrate some characteristics of the developed platform.
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1. Introduction
Terrorist attacks have nowadays become a serious threat, and this threat only continues to grow. The transport 
infrastructure is especially vulnerable to such a threat. Attempts can be made to load weapons, explosives materials 
and Special Nuclear Materials (weapons-grade uranium and plutonium) onto an aircraft or ship for the purpose of 
transporting them to another destination in a concealed manner among personal baggage or unaccompanied cargo 
(for example, hidden in a large sea cargo container).
One can identify the following major problems concerning seaport’s security:
x All of the existing imaging systems give no definite answer for a significant part of the cargoes under 
inspection. Moreover they are subject to false alarms, which cause time delays and the additional involvement of 
personnel in cargo and baggage inspection;
x Conventional systems do not allow the reliable automatic detection of radioactive material, while the 
international regulations are deeply concerned about this subject and no  system able to detect Special Nuclear 
Materials (Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons-Grade Plutonium) masked in a sophisticated way or hidden in 
the middle of big maritime containers in an amount less than 5 kg is available so far (Slaughter D. et al. 2003);
x There is no integrated system allowing the simultaneous detection of all types of weapons and dangerous 
materials. Currently, in order to perform such an inspection, it is necessary to use different types of equipment in 
sequence, which is an expensive and slow process.
x The conventional procedure includes the selection of suspicious cargo via indirect methods (documentation 
checks, intelligence service information) which are insufficiently reliable. For the technical reasons listed above 
(the absence of the proper equipment), only a small percentage of the selected cargos (which are selected in a 
relatively arbitrary manner in any case) is sent for additional inspection (for explosive and special nuclear 
materials).
As far as we know, currently, in the world market, there are no systems that provide a comprehensive solution to
the above mentioned problems, possibly due to the physical limitations of the techniques underlying the 
conventional inspection systems, as well as the absence, so far, of an integrated approach which would provide 
compensation for these limitations and drawbacks.
2. Explosives detection
2.1. Properties of explosives 
Despite the long list of terrorists’ potential instruments (biological, chemical, radioactive, explosive materials), 
the detection of explosives has always been one of the main priorities, because explosives:
x are most frequently used as a terrorist attack instrument;
x can be relatively easily bought or produced from the available components;
x can be relatively easily transported to a target place;
x are relatively difficult to detect;
x can be relatively easily prepared for the “operation mode”.
The functional components of a bomb (control system, detonator, explosive charge) can be identified by their 
shape. Such detection is traditionally performed by X-ray detection systems. However, plastic and liquid explosives 
do not have any specific shape and can be detected by their elemental contents.  All high explosives contain inside 
the molecule the oxygen necessary for the explosive reaction, with the most important oxygen carriers being organic 
nitro compounds, nitrates, chlorates and perchlorates so nitrogen is also contained in the majority of the explosives 
(data of Yinon 1999 and Rhykerd et al. 1999).
.
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2.2. Explosives detection technologies
The non-invasive control of explosives and nuclear materials in baggage and cargo containers is based on several 
physical methods which can be, to some extent, classified within several groups, which we discuss below.
2.2.1. X-ray detection technologies
Basic methods for the detection of dangerous objects using X-ray and Gamma-ray scanning were elaborated in 
the 1970s. Modern X-ray equipment is able to provide images with good resolution and penetration depth. However, 
X-ray inspection may fail to detect several kinds of explosives and plastic weapons, as well as liquid explosives and 
shielded dangerous materials. Weapons and explosives may also be masked using other objects and materials with a 
high density. The efficiency of the X-ray inspection depends on the solution of the operator. However, the attention 
of the operator is essentially decreased after a rather short time period (about 20 mins). To increase the level of 
security, X-ray inspection is combined with the manual inspection of baggage, including the random manual 
inspection of unsuspicious objects.  The application of X-ray techniques for the detection of explosives is based on 
the difference in density between explosives and civil materials with a similar atomic number (Z). The majority of 
the most widely used explosives have a density exceeding 1.4 g/cm3. The simultaneous registration of the density 
distribution and the distribution of the average atomic number Z in the object under inspection allows the detection 
of hidden explosives with a relatively low level of false alarms. Therefore, X-ray TV systems with proper hardware 
and software tools for information processing are considered nowadays as the fastest, most cost effective tools for 
explosives detection. As stated by Wilke (2005) and Wood (2005), the main trend is the development of systems that 
are able to detect explosives automatically, without the involvement of an operator.
x Most used X-ray inspection methods and X-ray TV equipment are the following
x X-ray transmission radiography
x X-ray backscattering
x Dual energy X-ray systems
x X-ray computer tomography
It should be noted that dual energy X-ray systems yield superior material discrimination through the comparison 
of the attenuation of X-ray beams at two energies. However, the result still depends essentially on the qualification 
of the operator, as the reliability of the automatic detection is insufficient. The current equipment effectively detects 
cold weapons, fire guns and unmasked explosives. However, the practice has shown that even very experienced 
operators experience difficulty in detecting plastic explosives (see Zhengrong et al. 2006).
The further development of X-ray detection systems has been related to computer tomography (CT), which is an 
even more sophisticated X-ray technique in which cross sectional images (“slices”) of an object are numerically
reconstructed from X-ray projections at various angles around the object. These cross-sectional images can be 
combined to produce a three dimensional image (as in medical CAT scans). Modern computer tomography 
involving two X-ray sources allows not only the reconstruction of 3D images of the objects in baggage, but also 
shows the space distribution of the density and atomic number Z in the baggage (see Analogic Corporation 
http://www.analogic.com/products-security-checked-baggage-examiner-3dx.htm). However, despite the successful 
application of computer tomography for the inspection of hand luggage and small-size baggage, so far, no such 
systems have been developed that are suitable for the detection of explosives and nuclear materials in cargo 
containers. The reason is that the later task demands higher resolution detectors, powerful X-ray sources and highly 
efficient computational hardware and software allow very fast data processing.
2.2.2. Neutron technologies
2.2.2.1. Background
Neutron based inspection systems can detect a wide variety of substances of importance for different purposes, 
from national security threats (e.g., nuclear material, explosives, narcotics) to customs duties, shipment control and 
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validation, and for the protection of the environment. The inspection is generally founded on the nuclear interactions
of the neutrons with the various nuclides presented and the detection of the resultant characteristic emissions. The 
penetrability of fast neutrons as probes and the gamma rays and fission neutrons as signatures make neutron 
interrogation applicable for large conveyances, such as cars, trucks and marine containers. It also allows their 
employment in the detection of shielded explosives (Carasco et al. 2008). 
The main such techniques are the following:
Thermal neutron analysis (TNA)
The basis for the technique called thermal-neutron analysis (TNA) is the detection of gamma rays from thermal 
neutrons captured in nitrogen. The detecting emission has a specific very-high-energy 10.8 MeV, which makes it 
possible to distinguish nitrogen in the presence of many other perturbing materials. While there are other possible 
reactions, using thermal neutrons on nitrogen does not require an accelerator. Thermal neutrons can be generated 
with a radioisotope or a small accelerator, applying a moderator for energy adjustment. Therefore, systems based on 
thermal neutrons are comparatively small in size and require less shielding. 
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA)
Fast Neutron Analysis is based on the interaction of fast neutrons, mostly via inelastic neutron scattering, with 
the elements of interest, principally, the carbon, nitrogen and oxygen of the explosives. By detecting and measuring 
a range of the outgoing gamma rays, it is possible to calculate the elemental proportions – how much of each 
element (C, N, O) is present with respect to the others – and this permits the determination of the type of substance 
under analysis. 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA)
Pulsed operations allow the use of timing information which can be useful in reducing the influence of 
background radiation from neutron interactions. Pulsed operations are particularly interesting when using very short 
fast neutron pulses (typically nanosecond wide, 10-9 sec).
Pulsed Fast-Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA)
The PFTNA setup utilized pulses of fast neutrons with microsecond pauses in between and is capable of 
measuring gamma rays resulting from both fast and thermal neutron reactions.
Associated Particle Technique (APT)
Associated Particles Imaging technique involves “tagging” the primary neutron by the associated alpha particles 
that are produced through a deuterium-tritium (DT) fusion reaction in an electronic neutron generator. This method 
can utilize the Time of Light technique by measuring the time of alpha particles’ detection and accepting for material 
content identification only those gamma-rays that coincide with “tagged” neutrons.
Neutron Resonance Radiography (NRR)
Fast Neutron Resonance Radiography (NRR) has been suggested for the detection of explosives and drugs in 
passenger suitcases. With the NRR method, fast neutron radiographic images taken at different neutron energies are 
used for calculating the elemental mapping of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and the sum of other elements. 
Thus, explosives and drugs can be located and identified by their characteristic elemental composition.
2.2.3. Explosive Trace Detectors
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) is the detection of the presence of the constituent elements of explosive 
materials by collecting and analyzing trace molecular evidence from the examined object and its environment. 
There are some scarcely avoidable problems associated with ETD technologies, including:
• Labour intensive (cost) technology;
• An inability to detect sealed explosives;
• An inability to detect weapons.
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2.2.4. Nuclear Quadruple Resonance (NQR)
The basic radio frequency technique used for the detection of explosives is Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance 
(NQR) (Itozaki and Ota 2008). The basic principle of NQR is the same as that of Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI), employed in the medical field. The Radio Frequency (RF) wave that is irradiated and absorbed by the 
nuclear spin is then re-emitted when the nuclei returns to its previous steady state direction. The frequencies of this 
emission are specific to different materials, so the nature and amount of the explosive or other material (i.e. drugs) 
can be determined. NQR technology demonstrates many advantages, such as low cost, human independent operation 
and the absence of any ionizing radiation, but it can detect only crystalline structured explosives and is sensitive to 
background radio interference.
2.2.5. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF)
The NRF technique (Bertozzi and Ledoux 2009) is based on the excitation of the energy levels of the atoms of 
the explosive material. This causes re-scattering at frequencies specific to given isotopes. This method is very fresh 
and it is premature to discuss its advantages and drawbacks. However, one should note that its success depends 
essentially on the progress in the development of detection systems. Namely, high-resolution (with respect to narrow 
fluorescent lines in the interval 2 – 10 MeV) detectors are required. Currently, this is possible only at the laboratory 
level, where stable broad-spectrum gamma-ray sources and high resolution expensive cryogenic cooling detectors 
are available.
3. Detection of special nuclear materials (SNM)
3.1. Special Nuclear Materials Detection Task
Isotopes U-235 and Pu-239 are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as Special Nuclear Materials. Natural 
uranium contains 99.3% of U-238 and 0.7% of U-235. If it is enriched to 20% of U-235, it is defined as Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU). In nuclear weapons, uranium enriched to 90% of U-235 is usually used. Weapons-grade 
plutonium (WGPu) is also a mixture of isotopes containing at least 93% Pu-293. In order to produce one unit of a 
nuclear weapon, it is necessary to have 26 kg of HEU or 5 kg of WGPu. These weights are equivalent to volumes of 
11 cm3 and 6 cm3 correspondingly (Medalia 2009). The international smuggling of weapons grade nuclear material 
presents a significant security challenge. Between January 1993 and December 2003, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency reported 182 confirmed incidents involved nuclear material, with 18 incidents involving HEU or 
WGPu. (Orlov 2004).The proliferation of nuclear weapons can take place through the borders at ports and airports, 
via road passengers and through the postal system.
The main difficulty with the detection of Special Nuclear Materials is related to HEU, as its radioactivity is very 
low. U-235 is the only isotope suitable for the production of nuclear weapons that is available in nature in sufficient 
amounts. The relatively low radiation energy and high density of an HEU device make it strongly self-shielding. An 
HEU’s typical tenth value layer (TVL or the thickness of material that attenuates a given type of radiation by a 
factor of ten) is about 0.3 cm, and the size of the smallest HEU sphere that can be used for an explosion ranges from 
10 to about 38 cm. In other words, one can only observe the radiation from a very thin shell of the HEU; all other 
parts are self-shielded. The radioactivity of HEU is very low. The principal gamma ray emission of U-235 is 185 
keV and it is very easily attenuated by a fully load cargo container. The neutron emission is also negligible ~ 0.006 
n/s per kg.
The big concern is the possibility of smuggling SNM in large maritime containers with sufficient shielding by 
lead, which could be a most threatening scenario for world commercial flow.
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3.2. Techniques for SNM detection
3.2.1. Passive methods of radiation monitoring
There is various equipment available for the detection of radiological and nuclear threats using a passive method 
of radiation detection – registration of the gamma and neutron radiation. The technology for gamma ray detection 
includes plastic scintillation detectors; scintillation detectors based on sodium iodide crystals and cooled 
semiconductor germanium detectors. All of those detection technologies register gamma rays as a function of 
gamma ray energy with different resolutions. The better accuracy of gamma ray energy measurement provides the 
better identification of radioactive sources.
Radiation pagers are an example of a cheap, lightweight solution that can detect an elevated level of radiation but 
do not possess isotope identification capabilities. Radiation portal monitors are in wide use at border checkpoints. 
Many of them use PVT plastic scintillator detectors and cannot identify the radiation source. The more advanced 
type of such equipment exploits sodium iodide detectors and has sufficient energy resolution but experiences 
difficulties in differentiating close energy lines and registers weak signals in noisy environments. Usually, they can
recognize the radiation signatures of benign materials, thus reducing the false alarm rate. Radiation isotope 
identifiers use high purity germanium detectors. They can identify a radioisotope by its gamma spectrum, as 
germanium detectors possess very high energy resolution and can determinate energy peaks precisely, but cannot be 
applied for container inspection, as they have short range of radiation detection.
Considering the problem of Special Nuclear Material detection, neither of the devices described above can solve 
it reliably. The weak radiation signature of SNM, especially in the case of fully loaded containers or lead shielding, 
would be strongly attenuated and undistinguishable. Increasing the sensitivity of passive detectors would require an 
increased inspection time and inevitably lead to a high false alarm rate.
3.2.2. High energy X-rays
High-energy X-rays that are capable of penetrating thick cargo containers (with a penetration of up to 430 mm, 
and 17 inches of steel penetration) are now widely being used for contraband detection in seaports, airports, and at 
land border crossings.
High energy radiography equipment utilizes a highly radioactive gamma ray source like cobalt-60 or cesium 
137, or bremsstrahlung X-rays from a linear accelerator (with energy 2.5 – 6 MeV) that are capable of passing 
through loaded maritime containers and producing radiographic image of its content. Nevertheless, those systems 
cannot automatically differentiate between threats and benign materials.
Recently, Dual High Energy X-ray systems have been proposed for the detection of Special Nuclear Material in 
cargo containers. They use one or two linear accelerators to generate 6-MeV electrons, X-rays with energies from 0 
to 6 MeV and, in the same manner, X-rays with energies from 0 to 9 MeV. Photons of two different energy levels 
interact with matter differently. The high Z materials are much more opaque to 9 MeV photons (and interact more 
strongly with nuclear atoms) than to 6 MeV photons, so high Z materials can be recognized. Such systems have a 
threshold of about Z>72, which includes tungsten, gold, lead, uranium, and plutonium. Then, a special algorithm 
calculates the size and Z of individual objects and, based on that data, determines alarm events.
3.2.3. The Photonuclear reaction method
High-energy X-ray systems could also exploit the characteristic of U-235 and Pu-239: they fuse when struck by 
photons with energy above approximately 5.6 MeV. The resulting fission products decay over many seconds, 
producing prompt and delayed neutrons and gamma rays, which are gathered and analyzed for SNM detection and 
identification. The irradiated high-energy X-rays may thus be used to detect high-Z material in general and SNM in 
particular. Several prototypes of dual energy radiography systems with an ability to detect SNM via the
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photonuclear reaction method have been developed but still remain far from being implemented as a commercial 
solution.
3.2.4. Neutron activation for SNM detection
Special Nuclear Materials can be reliably detected by fission unique signatures induced by probing neutrons. 
Those signatures include prompt and delayed neutrons and prompt and delayed gamma rays, and have continued 
energy spectra. They can be distinguished from the background as they possess a specific energy range and temporal 
due away features. The developed laboratory prototype for a scanning system based on neutron interrogation 
showed promising results for SNM detection in cargo containers (Slaughter D. et al. 2003).
3.2.5. Muon Tomography
Muon is a heavy subatomic particle that is generated when a cosmic ray strikes an atom in the upper atmosphere. 
Most muons travel at a relativistic speed of over 95% of the speed of light. They are highly penetrating. For 
example, they can penetrate 1.3 m of lead, 15 m of water or tens of meters of rock and other matter before 
attenuating as a result of absorption or deflection by other atoms. About 10,000 muons reach every square meter of 
the earth's surface per minute. Muon tomography (MT) measures the muon’s trajectories before and after it
penetrates the investigated object. It defines the angle of muon deflection and the point of deflection, then integrates 
data from numerous muon trajectories in order to form a three-dimensional image of the container based on the
density and Z of its contents.
The laboratory pilot tests of MT have shown that this technology is still too immature for full scale 
implementation. The list of revealed problems includes the time required for adequately resolving the investigated 
content image and the limited material identification ability.
3.2.6. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence
Nuclear resonance fluorescence uses photons to excite the nucleus and measures the characteristic gamma 
radiation that is then emitted when de-excited. The deexcitation structure is unique to the target nucleus, so this 
technique provides excellent elemental/isotopic identification. The detection of the high-energy characteristic lines 
of gamma emissions will require a high-resolution detector, such as an HPGe detector. The source of the incident 
photons is typically bremsstrahlung radiation.
NRF systems were proposed for SNM detection and explosive detection (as mentioned above) but the technology 
requires further experimentation in the laboratory.
4. Possible solution- Integrated system for the detection of dangerous and illicit materials
As shown above, so far, no systems are available that completely meet the requirements of homeland security 
and are simultaneously cost-efficient for cargo inspection. The current equipment is either both bulky and very 
expensive, does not provide completely reliable inspection results, or demands a time-consuming inspection 
procedure requiring several types of scanner (which is unacceptable given the huge and permanently increasing 
volume of transported cargo).
There is an obvious need for a detection system incorporating the following features:
x Universality, i.e. the ability to detect all four major types of dangerous material – weapons (both firearms and 
cold weapons), explosive materials, radiological materials (isotopes), and Special Nuclear Materials for Mass
Destruction Weapons (weapons-grade uranium, plutonium)
x Efficiency, i.e. correspondence with the international standards on the reliability of the inspection results and 
grade of false alarms
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x High operation speed (e.g. less than 10 min per standard 40ft sea container)
x Adjustability, i.e. the possibility of being installed in various environments, particularly where there is limited 
space.
In our opinion a natural step towards the reliable detection of illicit materials in cargoes of various space 
dimensions would be the development of an integrated system that combines the best features of the most developed 
technologies; namely, X-ray analysis (providing the high-speed monitoring and identification of suspicious objects 
and areas) and neutron analysis (providing high selectivity and precise identification). Such a layered approach 
would allow the avoidance of the unnecessary scanning of all objects in the active interrogation mode, thus reducing 
the inspection time. Moreover, it makes possible to clarify all suspicious areas in the container via a single system 
inspection.
Companies developing neutron analysis technologies had to develop such integrated systems when designing 
inspection systems for the hand luggage of air passengers, as the demands for the inspection time per unit do not 
allow complete scanning. That brought sound practical experience in the field. For example, Ratec EDS-5101C 
system has been developed and demonstrated as an integrated solution that can detect explosives, radioactive threats 
and Special Nuclear Material with Thermal Neutron Analysis for passenger luggage inspection (see Schubert 2003 
and Kozlovsky 2003). Since then, through intensive field studies, it has been realized that the successful solution for 
a cargo inspection system should consider an integrated approach based on the fusion of several inspection 
techniques.
For further development of this project Ratec has created a daughter company in the framework of Skolkovo 
Foundation - RatecLab. Company RatecLab Ltd develops universal detection system of high resolution gamma 
spectroscopy for tagged neutron analysis with time-of-light filtering (Skolkovo Grant for project NEWTRAN). Such 
high resolution detection platform address the shortcuts and problems associated with conventional detection 
systems that utilize detectors with relatively low resolution prone to high background problem and slow response 
time. As a result the average time of inspection would be reduced to about 8 min and space resolution to 5 mm.
The implementation of integrated systems with such innovative solutions could essentially diminish the main 
weakness of the current systems – the requirement for manual inspection – as it will decrease by many times the 
ratio of uncertain results arising from the automatic inspection.
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